STATE OF CALIFORNIA Budget Change Proposal - Cover Sheet

DF-46 (REV 10/20)

Fiscal Year	Business Unit	Department	Priority No.				
2023-24	0690, 2720, 7502, 8940		office of Emergency Services, California ighway Patrol, Department of Technology,				
Budget Requ	est Name	Program	Subprogram	m			
0690-019-BCF	P-2023-GB	0380 - Emergency Management					
0690-100-BCF	P-2023-GB	Services, 2050 – Traffic Management,					
2720-026-BCF	P-2023-GB	6230 - Department of Technology,					
7502-005-BCF	P-2023-GB	6911 - National Guard					
7502-039-BCF	P-2023-GB						
8940-024-BCF	P-2023-GB						
Rudget Regu	lest Description						

Budget Request Description

California Cybersecurity Integration Center

Budget Request Summary

The Office of Emergency Services, California Military Department, California Department of Technology, and the California Highway Patrol are jointly requesting \$28.7 million General Fund ongoing and 17 positions to continue limited-term resources authorized in 2020-21 (including 23 of the 24 previously authorized positions) and enhance resources to support the responsibilities of the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. These resources will allow the Cal-CSIC to lead state efforts to identify and mitigate current and ever-evolving cyber threats, including providing enhanced (1) threat detection, assessment, and research; (2) gap testing and remediation; and (3) incident analysis and response.

Requires Legislation ☐ Yes ☑ No		Code Section(s) to b Added/Amended/R	
Does this BCP contain informati components?	on technology (IT)	Department CIO	Date
If yes, departmental Chief Infor	mation Officer must sig	n.	
For IT requests, specify the proj \$1BA, \$2AA, \$3\$D, \$4PRA), and		ecent project approval d	ocument (FSR, SPR,
Project No. Project Approval	Document:		
Approval Date:			
If proposal affects another dep Attach comments of affected designee.		•	•
Prepared By Budget Office	Date 8/29/2022	Reviewed By	Date
Department Director	Date	Agency Secretary	Date
	Department of Find	ince Use Only	
Additional Review: Capital O	utlay 🗆 ITCU 🗆 FSCU [☐ OSAE ☐ Dept. of Techn	ology
PPBA Stephen Benson		Date submitted to the Leg 1/10/2023	jislature

A. Budget Request Summary

The Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), California Military Department (CMD), California Department of Technology (CDT), and the California Highway Patrol (CHP) are jointly requesting \$28.7 million General Fund ongoing and 17 positions to continue limited-term resources authorized in 2020-21 (including 23 of the 24 previously authorized positions) and enhance resources to support the responsibilities of the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC). These resources will allow the Cal-CSIC to lead state efforts to identify and mitigate current and ever-evolving cyber threats, including providing enhanced (1) threat detection, assessment, and research; (2) gap testing and remediation; and (3) incident analysis and response.

B. Background/History

Legal Authorities

In 2018, the Cal-CSIC was codified in California Government Code, Chapter 768, Section 8586.5.

By statute, the Cal-CSIC is required to include representatives from Cal OES (including the State Threat Assessment Center (STAC), CDT, CHP, CMD, the Office of the Attorney General (AG), and the California Health and Human Services Agency (CHHS), as well as other stakeholders from state and federal governments and the private sector. The statute further requires the Cal-CSIC to coordinate with the California State Threat Assessment System (STAS) and the United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to establish a cyber-incident response team and safeguard the privacy of individuals' sensitive information. Finally, statute requires the establishment of a Cyber Incident Response Team to serve as California's primary unit to lead cyber threat detection, reporting, and response in coordination with public and private entities across the state.

Mission

The Cal-CSIC's primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California's economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in our state. The Cal-CSIC serves as the central organizing hub of state government's cybersecurity activities and coordinates information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies; tribal governments; utilities and other service providers; academic institutions; and nongovernmental organizations. The Cal-CSIC operates in close coordination with the STAS and the DHS - National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, including sharing cyber threat information received from utilities, academic institutions, private companies, and other appropriate sources.

The Cal-CSIC provides warnings of cyberattacks to government agencies and nongovernmental partners, coordinates information sharing among these entities, assesses risk to critical infrastructure and information technology networks, prioritizes cyber threats and supports public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure and information technology networks, enables cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures, and supports cybersecurity assessments, audits, and accountability programs required by state law to protect the information technology networks of California's agencies and departments.

The Cal-CSIC is required to develop a statewide cybersecurity strategy, informed by recommendations from the California Task Force on Cybersecurity and in accordance with state and federal requirements, standards, and best practices. This Task Force, more

commonly known as the California Cybersecurity Task Force (CCTF), is designed to represent all sectors and people of the state, as specified above. It is not structured to focus on or exclude any demographic. However, resource constraints force difficult decisions of where to apply those limited resources. The Cal-CSIC has strived to find an efficient balance with the resources it has and has always been eager to respond quickly and effectively to underserved populations such as rural counties. A small number of personnel has meant we are physically concentrated in the Sacramento area, but technology solutions and regional fusion centers have enabled us to significantly broaden this reach.

Initial Cal-CSIC Investment

As a result of the codification of the Cal-CSIC in 2018, Cal OES was able to redirect existing Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and General Fund resources equivalent to eight positions to support the initial steps to get the Cal-CSIC started. This redirection, however, is not sustainable as federal HSGP funding has continued to decline since 2018. Cal OES, CHP, CDT and CMD jointly requested 24 positions and ongoing funding in 2020-21. These positions were authorized, but with only three-year limited-term funding that will expire June 30, 2023. The breakdown of these positions and the 2022-23 funding is as follows:

- Cal OES 12 positions and \$8,084,000 General Fund
- CHP 4 positions and \$925,000 General Fund
- CMD 8 positions and \$1,232,000 General Fund
- CDT 0 positions and \$1,268,000 General Fund (the equivalent of six positions)

Accomplishments

- Staffing: Since receiving funding in July 2020, the Cal-CSIC has been actively hiring subject matter experts in cyber security. Personnel currently on-board include, but are not limited to network engineers, software engineers, cyber threat analysts, forensics experts, application, intelligence experts, and law enforcement professionals.
- 2. Organizational Structure: The Cal-CSIC has established three distinct functional areas: Cyber Operations Branch, Cyber Threat Intelligence Branch, and a Mission Support Branch.
 - a. Cyber Operations Branch (COB)
 - i. The COB is the Cal-CSIC's cyber incident response team. The operations team receives and reviews cyber tips and leads from a variety of sources. One primary source of cyber tips comes from California Compliance and Security Incident Reporting System (Cal-CSIRS), the State of California's primary incident reporting system. In 2021 alone, the COB received 2,158 tickets for analysis. Of those, over 420 tickets required various levels of analysis and/or incident response. Two very significant cyber events wherein substantial Cal-CSIC resources were leveraged included SolarWinds and Log4j investigations. Moreover, significant cyber resources were deployed to combat unemployment insurance fraud through the Employment Development Department Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) fraud investigation.
 - b. Cyber Threat Intelligence Branch (CTIB)
 - i. The establishment of the CTIB has afforded the Cal-CSIC the opportunity to develop and implement a suite of cyber threat intelligence sharing programs and technological platforms. One critical intelligence sharing program is the

Cal-CSIC's daily production of its "Morning Report". During 2021, the CIB published over 250 morning reports to approximately 1,450 agencies and/or organizations.

- ii. In 2021, the CTIB provided monthly tailored threat briefings (classified and unclassified) and authored 48 unique cyber threat intelligence products, on topics ranging from the threat posed by state sponsored cyber actors, the cyber risk from the Internet of Things (IoT) and guidance to mitigate worldwide cyber events such as the vulnerabilities discovered from Solar Winds, Colonial Pipeline, Log4j, and Kaseya attacks involving critical infrastructure and supply chain networks. In addition to the production of its own products, the CTIB also distributes partner products from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Multi State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), foreign partner intelligence agencies, and fusion centers from various states across the U.S.
- iii. The CTIB also includes a Tactical Intelligence Team regarding cyber threat defense, and in 2021, the Tactical Intelligence Team designed and implemented a near real-time tracking and notification platform to detect cyber vulnerabilities. During its first year of implementation (2021), the Cal-CSIC was able to detect 526 malicious events and notifications PRIOR to an actual breach occurring. This is the primary goal, prevention of a cyber-attack. Of these 526 events, 64 percent were considered "critical" vulnerabilities. Also in 2021, the Tactical Intelligence Team developed and deployed a web-based platform to better automate the acquisition of cyber incidents throughout the state and to better coordinate incident response efforts.

c. Mission Support Branch (MSB)

i. The establishment of the MSB has afforded the Cal-CSIC to become a leader in cyber threat intelligence and cyber incident response operations. MSB is charged with acquisition, configuration, development and maintenance of software and equipment support through defined requirements, architecture design, contract management, procurement, technical support, and training.

3. Technology

The Cal-CSIC has procured the most cutting-edge technological platforms to assist with mission success as set forth in statute. Cal-CSIC tools include but are not limited to contracts with industry leaders in cyber threat detection, intelligence, and mitigation. The Cal-CSIC can perform Dark Web deep threat hunting as well as pursue cyber threat actors across cyber space. These tools have greatly assisted major investigations such as the Employment Development Departments (EDD) Pandemic Unemployment (PUA) fraud. Through the OES' statewide EDD PUA fraud Task Force, billions of dollars have been recovered and returned to the state. The Intelligence and Operations branches worked together along with other state agencies to analyze unemployment insurance fraud and support local, state, and federal criminal investigations. These investigations led to several

arrests in 2021, and Cal-CSIC efforts helped identify avenues for anti-fraud measures within California's unemployment insurance program.

a. Through a partnership with Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), the Cal-CSIC was able to acquire an Operational Technology (OT) lab which is an exact replica of an electric substation switch (computer system). This OT lab will avail Cal-CSIC, and its partners, the ability to replicate attacks and most importantly defend attacks against our electrical grid.

4. Initiatives

The Cal-CSIC is in various stages of maturity in several program/initiative areas. The programs and/or initiatives listed below are all designed to align with the Cal-CSIC mission, which is to protect the State of California, its economy, critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks.

<u>Cal-Secure</u>. In 2021, the Cal-CSIC, in conjunction with the CDT, developed Cal-Secure, a multi-year cybersecurity roadmap for California. Cal-Secure was approved and endorsed by the Governor, and it follows the establishment of the California Homeland Security Strategy (specifically, the goal of Strengthen Security and Preparedness across Cyberspace) and the State Technology Strategic Plan. In late 2021, Cal-CSIC planned initial steps to begin a closer, more formalized, and more collaborative working relationship with CDT's Office of Information Security to jointly implement Cal-Secure and align our efforts with Cal-Secure priorities and track our progress toward Cal-Secure success measures. Cal-CSIC led a bi-weekly working group for this purpose in early 2022 and has already collaborated and coordinated with CDT OIS on multiple joint initiatives through this forum.

<u>Cyberspace Operational Protected Systems (COPS)</u>. Resulting from "Blue Leaks", a massive data breach involving hundreds of law enforcement (LE) agencies, the Cal-CSIC developed and leveraged its technological tools, to scan and secure the external networks of hundreds of our LE partners. As a result, these LE agencies and their networks are better protected against a cyber-attack.

<u>State Election Risk and Vulnerability Evaluation (SERVE)</u>. In conjunction with the OES led Election Security Task Force, the Cal-CSIC established SERVE. The Cal-CSIC performed attack surface vulnerability assessments for all 58 counties and their election computer systems. Nine counties responded requesting service. Relying upon open source, United States Intelligence Community (USIC) and private sector cyber threat intelligence, the Cal-CSIC was able to reduce the risk of state sponsored or criminal cyber actor disrupting our electoral process.

<u>Industrial Control Systems Analytics Program (ISAP)</u>. A program designed to protect the Operational Technology (OT) environments of our states most critical of critical infrastructure.

<u>Rapid Attack Vulnerability Enumeration (RAVEn)</u>. A program designed to examine cyber risk and illuminate vulnerabilities which serve as potential targets to be exploited from cyber threat actors.

<u>Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Program (CMAP)</u>. This program is designed to provide a cyber-security analysis or "scorecard" to assist with the level of cyber risk for that entity. This

scorecard can then be used by executive leadership to guide their cyber investment justifications with the goal of cyber risk reduction.

Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2). Working in conjunction with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Cal-CSIC is developing C2M2 which is designed to evaluate, prioritize, and improve cybersecurity maturity across CA's critical infrastructure sectors and partners. C2M2 was established to improve electricity subsector cybersecurity capabilities and to better understand the cybersecurity posture of the grid thus reducing the cyber risk posed by state sponsored and criminal actors.

From this program, we can better forecast strengths and weaknesses of the entity and facilitate recommendations and areas of improvement needed to meet stronger security level requirements.

This provides us a more complete picture of the cyber threat landscape of CA as we can see maturity levels across all of California. Further analysis of this combined with findings from RAVEn and threat intel-sharing can identify common weak links or common strong points with hard data and metrics to support findings. This leads to further enablement of strong intelligence sharing and recommendations to sector or geographical levels that can improve security posture on a much larger scale.

<u>Emergency Support Function – 18 (ESF 18)</u>. To ensure state resiliency from cyber-attack, the Cal-CSIC developed and completed ESF-18. ESF-18 establishes a unified command structure and framework to coordinate the states response to a significant cyber related event.

<u>Validation & Analysis of Lifeline Infrastructure- Data Sharing Initiative-State of California (VALIDS)</u>. As part of an automated information sharing initiative, VALIDS includes integration with ESF-18 reporting at the Cal OES headquarters level, accomplished through posting California specific incident tracking statistics. Cal OES and the STAC continue to be in close coordination on the completion of this project no later than the third quarter of FY 2022-23.

<u>The California Cybersecurity Task Force</u>. The California Cybersecurity Task Force is a cybersecurity advisory body for California composed of subcommittees focused on goals and objectives aligned to state (and federal) cybersecurity objectives and planning. This state Cybersecurity Task Force is intended to be comprised of subject matter experts and executive representatives from Federal, State, local, and tribal government, private industry, academia, and law enforcement in California. Fully supporting and sustaining the Cybersecurity Task Force requires substantial time and effort from Cal-CSIC personnel but brings large dividends back to the state in the deep and broad expertise of its members.

Resource History

(Dollars in thousands)

Program Budget	PY - 4	PY - 3	PY - 2	PY-1	PY	СҮ
Authorized Expenditures				11,061	11,508	11,508
Actual Expenditures				11,061	11,508	11,508
Revenues				0	0	0
Authorized Positions				24	24	24
Filled Positions				24	24	23
Vacancies						1

C. State Level Consideration

Cal OES' mission is to protect lives and property, build capabilities, and support communities for a resilient California. Additionally, the Cal OES Strategic Plan contains the following goals:

Goal 1: Anticipate and enhance prevention and detection capabilities to protect our state from all hazards and threats.

Goal 2: Strengthen California's ability to plan, prepare for, and provide resources to mitigate the impacts of disasters, emergencies, crimes, and terrorist events.

Goal 3: Effectively respond to and recover from both human-caused and natural disasters.

Goal 4: Enhance the administration and delivery of all state and federal funding and maintain fiscal and program integrity.

Goal 5: Develop a united and innovative workforce that is trained, experienced, knowledgeable, and ready to adapt and respond.

Goal 6: Strengthen capabilities in public safety communication services and technology enhancements.

The goals and objectives of the California Homeland Security Strategy serve as the framework for prioritizing and developing statewide homeland security capabilities over the next three years. This proposal supports the following goals:

Goal 1: Enhance Information Collection, Analysis, and Sharing, in Support of Public Safety Operations across California

Goal 2: Protect Critical Infrastructure and key Resources from All Threats and Hazards

Goal 3: Strengthen Security and Preparedness across Cyberspace

Goal 4: Strengthen Communications Capabilities through Planning, Governance, Technology, and Equipment Goal 5: Enhance Incident Recovery Capabilities

In 2021, CDT and the Cal-CSIC jointly developed Cal-Secure, a multi-year cybersecurity roadmap for California. Cal-Secure was approved and endorsed by the Governor, and it follows the establishment of the California Homeland Security Strategy (specifically, the goal of

Strengthen Security and Preparedness across Cyberspace) and the State Technology Strategic Plan: Vision 2023. Cal-Secure is broken into three roadmap categories – people, process, and technology, which the executive branch will focus on throughout the next five years to improve its cybersecurity maturity and identify and manage risks to the state. This plan outlines success measures that the state will achieve upon completion of the Cal-Secure objectives. Each category is equally important to achieve to ensure the success of the five-year plan.

D. Justification

The Cal-CSIC is currently operating under a three-year funding commitment, set to expire on June 30, 2023. As documented above, the Cal-CSIC has made tremendous progress in reducing the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California's economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks. However, significant work remains. Funding and resources aligned with the level of cyber threat we face today, and tomorrow is critically necessary to best protect our state networks and our critical infrastructure.

This proposal will enable the Cal-CSIC to broaden its reach into underserved communities through both technological solutions, opportunities to diverse groups through the CCTF, and organized events to influence state cybersecurity policy and practices.

In comparison to other states, California ranks toward the bottom for cybersecurity resources in proportion to our population. In a recent data call through the National Governors' Association, most respondents indicate actual or necessary growth in their cyber centers.

State/Organization	Personnel	Region Population (2022)	Per Capita Rate (per million)
New York City Cyber Command	250	8,865,000	28.20
Wisconsin	115	5,935,064	19.38
Alaska	12	731,011	16.42
South Dakota	12	901,165	13.32
New Jersey	54	9,200,000	5.87
North Carolina	40	10,678,831	3.75
Arizona	20	7,303,398	2.74
New York State Joint Security Operations Center (JSOC)	27	20,115,000	1.34
California	38	39,950,000	0.95
Virginia	4	8,750,000	0.46
Washington	2	7,901,429	0.25

Since its inception, the Cal-CSIC has grown through essentially three developmental stages:

1. Initial formation funded by a mixture of Homeland Security Grant Funding and state General Fund prior to the initial investment in 2020-21. This initial stage enabled us to build a framework for a new organization, hire a core cadre of start-up staff, and begin basic elements of our mission.

- 2. The second stage is the current three-year limited-term investment in which the Cal-CSIC made substantial progress, from a staffing, technological and initiatives perspective. During this period, the Cal-CSIC began executing many elements of its mission and formed plans for continued growth to both meet original statutory requirements and address emerging threats and challenges. As we have learned through our accomplishments, our challenges, and through relationships established at various levels of government, the Cal-CSIC has a far greater understanding of the threat environment, and the unique and complex cybersecurity needs of California. As a result of our three years of work, coupled with industry leader forecasts, we recognized utilization of existing resources would only sufficiently address some, but not all, of the Cal CSIC's statutory requirements at an appropriate level to reduce risk. Simply put, the vastness of the State of California and its relative cyber risk demands a commensurate number of cyber professionals and tools which are aligned with mission requirements of the Cal-CSIC. Current staffing levels were sufficient to "start-up" this endeavor, however; ongoing resources are necessary to continue to identify and mitigate current and future cyber threats and ensure all statutory requirements are met more efficiently and effectively.
- 3. The third phase represents the state's ongoing commitment to cyber security. This plan contemplates existing and future requirements and lessons learned since the inception of the Cal-CSIC. It also reflects a changing and continual increasing threat landscape, where cybersecurity plays an even bigger role than many envisioned four years ago. As outlined below, many previously theoretical threats are manifesting in the real world and impacting California daily. Lastly, as Cal-CSIC customers interact with us and their understanding of our capabilities and value grow, their interest in and demand for our services also grows in a way that is not completely tied to the threat landscape. This proposal will grow the Cal-CSIC from the current 24 positions and \$11.5 million to 40 positions and \$28.7 million, as outlined below:
 - Cal OES 26 positions (12 existing and 14 new) and \$23,213,000 General Fund
 - CHP 3 positions (a reduction of one) and \$849,000 General Fund
 - CMD 8 positions (all existing) and \$1,318,000 General Fund
 - CDT 3 positions (all new) and \$3,360,000 General Fund

Current Cyber Threat Environment

1.) National Cyber Threat Overview

Cyber threats to California's security are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity. The cyber threat landscape is vast and deep and regularly influenced by the world around us. When the COVID-19 pandemic began, an uptick was observed in targeting of healthcare and research and development. Now, the situation unfolding in the Ukraine shows how tightly the geopolitical and cyber world are intertwined.

The ranges of cyber threat actors, methods of attack, targeted systems and victims are also expanding. According to the U.S. government National Cyber Strategy, cyber threats will continue to increase in the coming years, as more devices are connected to the internet and threat actors grow their attack capabilities. Attack methods such as

¹ Mandiant - Three Year Cybersecurity Trending for California (2020-2022), pg 12

ransomware and malware have spread globally resulting in major disruptions and exfiltration of sensitive data.

Attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in California's cyberspace have not changed dramatically over the past three years, but the overall trends are still evolving. For example, adversary organizations are migrating to the cloud at an increasing rate. Notable observations from Mandiant are listed below²:

2020

- Malware authors are innovating—possibly to evade detection technologies—and not just relying on updates to existing malware.
- Cyber criminals that historically targeted personal and credit card information are increasingly turning to ransomware as a secondary source of income. Cyber criminals are also outsourcing tasks to monetize operations faster.
- To expand the way they monetize operations, attackers have been observed targeting corporate reward systems to steal gift cards. These gift cards are then resold or used to make direct purchases.

2021

- As ransomware operators were attacking state and municipal networks alongside
 hospitals and schools, a global pandemic response to COVID-19 necessitated a move
 to remote work for a significant portion of the economy.
- Ransomware has evolved into multifaceted extortion where actors not only deploy ransomware encryptors across victim environments, but also employ a variety of other extortion tactics to coerce victims into complying with demands.
- Threat actors took advantage of infrastructure supporting work-at-home with an increased focus on vulnerability exploitation.

2022

- Critical vulnerabilities such as "Log4Shell" highlight the dangers of the unknown and the
 complexity of patching. Log4Shell is a vulnerability in the Log4j component of Apache,
 a popular webserver platform. Log4Shell has been heavily exploited since December
 2021. This has resulted in major cyberattacks and disruptions worldwide and in
 California. Cal-CSIC has assisted state agencies running webservers affected by the
 vulnerability. The supply chain is as attractive as ever target, providing a potential entry
 point into multiple vendors.
- Ransomware and multifaceted extortion continue to be concerning. There was an
 observable increase in targeting of virtualization infrastructure and offer mitigations.
 Guidance on ransomware preparedness (via red teaming) and recovery operations
 was published to address this issue.

The following statistics provide a brief snapshot of the cybersecurity threat we face today:

• The average cost of a data breach rose from \$3,860,000 in 2020 to \$4,240,000 in 2021.

² Mandiant - Three Year Cybersecurity Trending for California (2020-2022), pg 3

- Ransomware attacks increased by an estimated 127 percent in 2021.
- The remediation costs per incident associated with a ransomware attack increased from \$761,106 in 2020 to \$1,850,000 in 2021.
- Social engineering attacks posed the greatest threat to public administration, accounting for 69 percent of the data breaches experienced in the public administration sector during 2021.
- A new ransomware attack is estimated to have occurred somewhere globally, every 11 seconds during 2021.
- Double extortion attacks accounted for 8.7 percent of all reported ransomware incidents globally, in 2020 but increased 81 percent by the second quarter of 2021.

2.) Significant National Cyber Incidents

The below list of key incidents and issues created some of the most significant impacts to the U.S. economy in 2021:

- July 2021, hackers exploited a vulnerability in Kaseya's virtual systems/server administrator (VSA) software allowing them to conduct a ransomware attack that infected approximately 1,500 small and midsized businesses globally with REvil ransomware.
- May 2021, major multinational meat processing company JBS SA became the victim of a REvil ransomware attack that resulted in all of their U.S.-based meatpacking plants to shut down until June 2021.
- May 2021, Colonial Pipeline became the victim of a DarkSide ransomware attack that resulted in the pipeline being shut down for five days.
- February 2021, unknown hackers attempted to raise levels of sodium hydroxide in the water supply of Oldsmar, Florida after gaining unauthorized access to the network by exploiting a remote system access.

3.) Significant California Cyber Incidents

- a. 2021. The Cal-CSIC received 2,158 event leads from CAL-CSIRS, the state's security incident reporting system, of which 430 were identified by Cal-CSIC as cyber incidents requiring various levels of Cal-CSIC incident response or analysis. An additional 30 cyber incident notifications were received from a variety of sources. These 460 incidents represented an approximate increase of 265 percent from 2020 when we saw 126 incidents. Each of these 460 incidents required Cal-CSIC incident response actions including: 15 post-incident consults, 5 incident response events, 6 Mission Resource Taskings (MRT), and 4 assessments. Post-incident consults involve a minimum of 24 personnel hours per incident, but some can be much more involved and can require up to 80 hours. Incident response events which do not require MRTs require 2-3 Cal-CSIC personnel for up to three days, with 80 hours maximum for analysis and report writing. MRTs are large enough that they exceed Cal-CSIC's capacity to respond and require additional resources from CMD (typically 2-3 additional personnel), but still require 2-3 Cal-CSIC personnel for up to three days, with 80 hours maximum for analysis and report writing. Assessments are generally a response to a request for assistance that does not necessarily involve an intrusion or breach, but still require 2 personnel doing a combined 16 hours of work.
- b. Within these 460 incidents in 2021, the most prevalent type of cyber-attack observed was ransomware, which accounted for 43 percent or 198 incidents. We lack enough detailed and thorough data going before 2021 to make a comparison, but globally

ransomware increased 127 percent from 2020 to 2021 so we can safely assume that rate was similar for California. Rounding out the top three incident types in 2021 were corporate and personal data breaches at 28 percent and phishing/vishing/smishing incidents at 13 percent.


Additionally, the Healthcare and Public Health sector was the most targeted sector accounting for 16 percent or 67 observed incidents, followed by the Information Technology sector with 10 percent or 42 incidents, and lastly the Financial Services sector with 9 percent or 38 cyber incidents.

Regarding the cyber threat to the Healthcare Sector, two significant events occurred in California in 2021.


- May 2021, Scripps Health, a nonprofit healthcare provider headquartered in San Diego, suffered a significant cyber-attack. Scripps Health system consists of five hospitals, 19 outpatient facilities, and provides healthcare services to over half-million patients and over 2,600 affiliated physicians.
- October 2021, the Los Angeles branch of Planned Parenthood (PPLA) disclosed their networks were breached by a ransomware attack. Initial investigation revealed at least 400,000 patient records were stolen.

The chart below illustrates the regions of California that experienced cyber incidents during 2021. The highest concentration of cyber incidents was observed in the Los Angeles and the San Francisco/Bay Area regions of California; almost certainly due to the high number of corporate presence and population density.

Critical Infrastructure Sector




The chart below illustrates the top three cyber incident types observed in California during 2021 and the region in which they were observed.




c. 2022. During the first half of 2022, the Cal-CSIC received 1,557 cyber event leads from Cal-CSIRS, plus an additional reported 223 cyber incidents received from other sources. Of those 223 cyber incidents listed above, 133 were considered cybercrimes and 90 as data breaches. In summary, ransomware was by far the most frequent cybercrime, accounting for 56 percent of all cyber incidents in California in the first half of 2022. Information Technology, Professional/Non-Professional Services, Commercial Facilities, and Government Facilities Sectors were the most frequently targeted for attacks. Investment crimes in California climbed sharply in the first half of 2022 in both victim loss and number of reported crimes from the first half of 2021. Lastly, tech Support crimes have also risen in the year-over-year period, with reported victim losses nearly doubling for Californians. At this rate of rise, it is projected nearly 2,500 CSIRs leads will be received.

The chart below provides historical context of Cal-CSIRS cyber reporting, since 2016. The total number for 2022 is a projection based on a total of 1557 incidents recorded through August 17, 2022 (approximate average rate of 6.8 per day).



Based on the current rate of growth, we estimate incidents will increase by approximately five percent in 2023 and another 12 percent beyond that in 2024.

The chart below shows the first half of 2022 cyber incident data by geographical location, incident type, and critical infrastructure sector for the 223 cyber incidents mentioned above.



In summary, no industry sector was spared from ransomware attacks. Sectors such as healthcare, educational facilities, information technology, government and military contractors were all targeted. The Professional and Non-Professional sub-sectors along with Construction ("Other" sector) were hit particularly hard by ransomware, accounting for 25 attacks (33 percent of ransomware attacks) in the first half of 2022. Attacks against the Information Technology (29 percent). Other (22 percent), Government Facilities (including Educational Facilities, 11 percent), and Commercial Facilities (including Retail, 11 percent) sectors accounted for nearly three-quarters of all cybercrimes.

Two other sectors of critical importance to the economic prosperity of California—Food and Agriculture and Healthcare and Public Health—each accounted for five percent of all incidents in the first half of 2022.

Protection of Critical Infrastructure

An area of prioritization for the Cal-CSIC is ensuring the lights stay on, the water keeps flowing and essential services of our daily lives remain resilient and without disruption caused by either a natural disaster or manmade (cyber, terrorism) event.

In conjunction with DHS' National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NCIPP) and the STAC's Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP), we have identified and qualified all the critical infrastructure assets in the state. As such, 1,309 assets have been identified and categorized. Of these, 548 are lifeline sectors, such as communications, energy, transportation, water and wastewater systems. They are further broken down:

- Communications 42 assets
- Energy 174 assets
- Transportation 136 assets
- Water and Wastewater Systems 196 systems

As we have seen in recent years, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure can have devastating impacts on many sectors of our economy. A recent example from the energy sector is the cyber-attack on the Colonial Pipeline. In May 2021 a ransomware attack against a U.S. fuel pipeline operator, Colonial Pipeline was reported. This attack affectively shut down a major oil pipeline, referred to as the "jugular of the U.S. pipeline," that supplies nearly half of all the gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and other refined products from the Gulf Coast to the eastern and southern U.S. The shutdown of this pipeline temporarily halted the delivery of critical fuels to potentially 38 to 52 percent of the entire U.S. population.

An example from the Water and Wastewater Systems is the February 2021 cyber-attack, wherein unknown hackers attempted to raise levels of sodium hydroxide in the water supply of Oldsmar, Florida after gaining unauthorized access to the network by exploiting a remote system access.

As referenced above under initiatives, the Cal-CSIC identified a cybersecurity gap regarding critical infrastructure and has developed two specific programs (CMAP and C2M2) to assist in closing that gap.

Cyber Threat Outlook

As we attempt to forecast the cyber threat to the State of California, we are starkly reminded that there are many threat actors we face, with a wide variety of motivations, tools, and tactics.

Nation-State actors will deploy necessary cyber resources to advance their national security, political and economic agendas. The following is snapshot of the top four Nation-State actors and the advanced persistent threat they pose to California³:

Russia: Russia will maintain an aggressive posture throughout the remainder of 2021 and into 2022, with a sustained emphasis on targeting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Afghanistan, and the energy sector. The U.S. government attributed the UNC2452 attack (also referenced as the SolarWinds supply chain compromise incident) to Russia, which demonstrates Russia can achieve widespread impact. We expect supply chain and software supply chain environments to continue to be targeted by Russia next year. Additionally, UNC2452's manipulation of authentication methods in hybrid cloud/on-premises environments highlight innovative tactics, leading us to believe the level of sophistication and scope of Russian operations will expand.

<u>Iran:</u> Iran will use its cyber tools in a much more aggressive manner to promote regional interests. Information operations attributed by the U.S. to Iran in 2020 and 2021 demonstrated more aggressive tactics than previously seen. Iran will also continue to target Israel and others in the Middle East. They've shown their capability and willingness to use destructive malware, so we expect them to take advantage of any opportunities that are presented. Ultimately, we'll see Iran trying to create more of a power balance shifted to its own interests. We have seen them targeting abroad, but their targeting will most likely be regional throughout 2022.

<u>China</u>: China will continue to be very aggressive, supporting the Belt and Road Initiative using cyber espionage. Now that the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have completed most of their reorganization, their operations are going to become much more focused. China has shown a willingness to scale their operations and take steps that they were previously unwilling to take. As geopolitical tensions continue to rise, the big question is "When are we going to see China flex some of their known but as-yet-unused destructive capabilities?"

<u>North Korea</u>: North Korea, with its geographical, international, and financial challenges, is willing to take a lot of risks. In 2022, we expect to see North Korea flex its cyber capabilities to make up for its lack of other instruments of national power. The North Korean cyber apparatus will continue to support the Kim regime by funding nuclear ambitions and gleaning strategic intelligence.

Criminal threat actors, mostly motivated by money, will remain one of the top threats we face in California. Ransomware is going to continue to evolve and increase in severity. Ransomware threat has grown significantly throughout the past decade, and it will continue its upward trend4. Ransomware actors are becoming increasingly aggressive, turning these once relatively simple attacks into more elaborate, lucrative, and multifaceted extortion operations. U.S. and international efforts are underway, but these mitigation efforts are having little to no effect to the relatively new "ransomware-as-service" model5.

³ Mandiant. 14 Cyber Security Predications For 2022 and Beyond, pg. 4

⁴ Mandiant. 14 Cybersecurity Predictions for 2022 and Beyond. Pg 2

⁵ Mandiant. 14 Cybersecurity Predictions for 2022 and Beyond. Pg 8

It is forecasted that cyber-attacks against operational technology (OT) networks will increase mostly. In 2021, Mandiant observations reveal that low sophistication threat actors learned they could create big impacts in the OT space, even bigger than their intended consequences. As such, it is expected threat actors will explore the OT space in 2022 and beyond and increasingly deploy ransomware against those networks. Attacks against OT systems are largely attacks against critical infrastructure networks. Attacks against OT environments can cause serious disruption and even threaten human lives, increasing the pressure of organizations to pay a ransomware.

Cyber espionage, often referred to misinformation/disinformation, will remain a consistent threat in California. These campaigns are largely influenced by world events and designed to influence Californians on a wide variety of topics. As deep-fake technologies become more widely available, criminal and espionage actors will increasingly integrate manipulated media into their operations to make social engineering more convincing, which will most likely defeat some automated identity verification systems.6

In the coming years, we expect to see a continued growth of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, many of which will be inexpensive and created without cybersecurity in mind. Because all of these devices are connected, we will see the general attack surface expand greatly with the potential for serious impact7. We have observed several case examples wherein thousands of IoT devices were leveraged to create a Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack against an intended target.

If we use the workload of the CTIB team as an indicator, demand for services has been significantly increasing while the team, as effective as they are, is potentially seeing a plateau of their capacity. We interpret this as a resource being maximized facing increasing demand rather than any change in performance. In fact, the breadth and types of intel support has continued to become more sophisticated, and event support has increased. Increasing subscriber demand can be interpreted as an indicator of general awareness of the threat landscape, but also as an indication of the critical necessity of the CTIB team's work.

Year	Cyber Thr	eat Intelligen Subscribers ^A	ce Service		Cyber Threat Intelligence Production						
	Morning Report Subscribers	Monthly Threat Brief Subscribers	Intelligence Product Distro List	Advisories	Executive Summaries	Cybersecurity Bulletins	Alerts ^B	Notifications ^c	Events Supported (Exercises, National Security Events)		
2019	No data	No data	No data	7	1	2	No data	No data			
2020	487	470	873	7	3	1	2	No data	2		
2021	854	880	1,317	9	5	2	49	374	7		
2022 ^D	1269	1,290	1,806	1	5	9	17	209	5		
2022 ^E	2032	2065	2891	2	8	14	27	335	8		

- A. Subscriber data not available prior to 2020
- B. Alerts metric not tracked until 2020
- C. Notification's metric not tracked until 2021
- D. Data as of 17 Aug 2022
- E. Data projected for 2022 based on average monthly rate

⁶ Mandiant. 14 Cybersecurity Predictions for 2022 and Beyond. Pg 5

⁷ Mandiant. 14 Cybersecurity Predictions for 2022 and Beyond. Pg 7

Gaps

During each phase of Cal-CSIC's growth to-date we have encountered, analyzed, and planned how to close capability gaps. We define these gaps as differences between how we interpret our statutory mandate versus our actual capability and mission effectiveness. As mentioned before, we see this through the lens of three distinct phases:

- Phase 1) launch and initial growth prior to 2020-21 investment,
- Phase 2) 2020-21 to 2022-23 investment funded by General Funds and HSGP, and
- Phase 3) 2023-24 and on-going investment.

While many gaps have been closed in the first two phases, many remain, and we anticipate a significant shortfall in capability.

The Cal-CSIC staffs less than one (0.95) cybersecurity personnel per million in population. This is extremely low compared to states like Wisconsin, Alaska, and South Dakota with staffing rates above 10 per million. Additionally, the New York City Cyber Command is staffed at 28.20 cybersecurity personnel per million people in the city, on top of the New York State Joint Security Operations Center (JSOC) with 1.34 cybersecurity personnel per million people in the state.

California is massive in physical size, population, and economy. Its size along with a myriad of unique assets including: 11 seaports; 1 U.S border; agriculture industry, technology industry, and a complex critical infrastructure create a higher-than-average demand on cybersecurity while staffing numbers lag far behind the norm.

As indicated above, incidents including those requiring Cal-CSIC response continue to increase at a rate that nearly doubles over six years. Cal-CSIC intelligence services continue to see increasing demand at a rate that is on pace to be five times what it was in 2020. This is due to three primary factors:

- Factor 1) an evolving threat landscape which could not be fully predicted three years ago, Factor 2) increasing customer demand as they become aware of and appreciate our services, and
- Factor 3) our increasingly sophisticated understanding of our mission and resources necessary to execute it successfully.

It should be noted that the Cal-CSIC is still a relatively new organization and function within the state, and our collective understanding of how it can and should work has evolved tremendously since our inception. Despite these growing demands, our personnel and resources will not grow to keep pace without additional investment. Listed below are areas where we still see capability gaps.

- 1. Build and maintain an asset model for the state, aka "California cyber terrain":
 - a. Gap: the Cal-CSIC has a partial picture of California's cyber terrain
 - b. Impact:
 - i. will miss emerging threats and early stages of major incidents
 - ii. will be dependent on voluntary reporting from outside parties and
 - iii. will be in a reactive posture unable to prevent attacks from occurring in some cases
- 2. Establish Semi-Automated Processes:
 - a. <u>Gap</u>: as the Cal-CSIC program matures, the demand for automation shifts from internal to external with customers and partners. Demand will become unmanageable
 - b. <u>Impact</u>: the lack of available automation will result in precious resources being wasted using ad-hoc, manual, one-off approaches

- 3. Maintained state-level cyber security scorecard:
 - a. Gap: assessment capabilities and stakeholder partnerships lack maturity
 - b. <u>Impact</u>: without a thorough statewide baseline of cyber risk, priority-based resource allocation suffers
- 4. Incident Response Capacity Scaled to Typical Demand, Surge, and Projected Threat:
 - a. Gap: Increasing incident workload is outpacing current staffing levels.
 - b. <u>Impact</u>: the Cal-CSIC's ability to provide critical response services diminishes over time.
- 5. Intelligence Analysis Capacity Scaled to Typical Demand, Surge, and Projected Threat:
 - a. <u>Gap</u>: The CTIB team saw demand for their products grow by 51% from 2020 to 2021 and we project demand to grow to 186% of the current level by 2024. Again, workload is outpacing current staffing levels.
 - b. <u>Impact</u>: leaders will be less informed when making critical cybersecurity risk decisions.
- 6. Full multi-sector coverage:
 - a. <u>Gap</u>: Without an increase of resources, our ability to best protect our critical infrastructure as categorized previously in the "Protection of Critical Infrastructure" section will be significantly impacted.
 - b. <u>Impact</u>: cybersecurity risks to certain sectors like water infrastructure will not be tracked at adequate levels
- 7. Fully leverage Cybersecurity Task Force:
 - a. <u>Gap</u>: The Cybersecurity Task Force will be underutilized due to staffing constraints and prioritization of staffing resources.
 - b. <u>Impact</u>: partner commit levels will decrease causing reputational damage to Cal-CSIC, OES, and the state.
- 8. Full application of Operational Technology (OT) and Forensics Labs:
 - a. <u>Gap</u>: the resources required to processing OT and Forensics Lab workloads will be outpaced by projected demand
 - b. Impact: These critical resources will become underutilized
- 9. OT lab fully representative of all sectors:
 - a. Gap: The OT lab is in its initial implementation phase
 - b. Impact: not all sectors are fully represented.
- 10. Robust Cal-CSIC-hosted cybersecurity exercise program:
 - a. <u>Gap</u>: the demand (invitations to participate/requests to host) towards cybersecurity exercises and joint operations is outpacing current staffing levels
 - b. <u>Impact</u>: these vital programs that benefit the state and the nation will become less effective.

Summary

The vastness of the State of California, coupled with its global economic impact, is a prime target for state-sponsored and criminal actors. The proposal set forth strikes the appropriate balance of maintaining what we have begun, while increasing the necessary resources (staff and technology) commensurate to the level of cyber risk we face. Current staffing levels were sufficient to "start-up" this endeavor, however; additional resources are requested to identify and mitigate current and further cyber threats more efficiently and effectively.

E. Outcomes and Accountability

By securing the additional 17 positions, the Cal-CSIC will be positioned to comply with statutory requirements and have sufficient resources to respond to the ever-increasing cyber threat. This will allow for the establishment of a well-trained team, housed at the Cal-CSIC Mather, CA location that will draw on competencies and resources from numerous technical

backgrounds, assist in analyzing cyber threat intelligence, and prepare, respond, and mitigate cyber threats to California's cyber infrastructure.

With additional resources and improved ability to capture and analyze data, the Cal-CSIC will develop quantitative and qualitative metrics to measure the economic impact and overall cyber risk for relevant regions and populations to ensure cyber resources are deployed to high-risk areas and institutions. The Cybersecurity Task Force will be a key mechanism for identifying unserved or underserved regions and populations. The additional positions will assist in fully leveraging the refurbished and improved main office workspace and newly formed forensics lab, expand the specialized individual skills of Cal-CSIC incident responders, provide additional support in cyber threat intelligence gathering and sharing threat intelligence with Cal-CSIC partners and customers, and assist in identifying cyber risks based on evolving and emerging cyber threats. Additionally, the extra positions will assist in conducting forensic analysis on infected/compromised physical and virtual hardware to determine the extent and impact it caused and assist with mitigating controls to properly contain cyber threats against California's critical infrastructure and economy.

F. Analysis of All Feasible Alternatives

Alternative 1: Approve \$28.7 million General Fund ongoing and 17 positions to continue limited-term resources authorized in 2020-21 (including 23 of the 24 previously authorized positions) and enhance resources to support the responsibilities of the Cal-CSIC. These resources will allow the Cal-CSIC to lead state efforts to identify and mitigate current and ever-evolving cyber threats, including providing enhanced (1) threat detection, assessment, and research; (2) gap testing and remediation; and (3) incident analysis and response.

Pros:

- Ensure continuation of initial state investment in cyber security and statutory requirements.
- Expands California's capabilities to analyze need and deliver services across the state, keeping pace with the growing severity and pervasiveness of cyber threats more equitably.
- Shift from a more reactive posture to a more proactive posture in anticipating and stopping cyberattacks before they result in harm.
- In addition to adding depth, will enable Cal-CSIC to add breadth of services adding capabilities that it did not previously wield making a more complete suite of services.
- Reduces the level of cyber risk facing the state, its 225,000 employees, multiple large networks (including CGEN, CALNET, and CENIC), more than 80 state-provided network services, and over 1 million endpoints, which are all part of the attack surface exploited by cyber threat actors.
- With expanded cyber threat detection automation and analysis, reduces state agency remediation costs related to intrusion or cyber breach. As referenced above, average remediation cost per intrusion in 2021 was \$1,850,000 (industry reporting on ransomware).
- Enhances the Cal-CSIC's ability to support unserved/underserved populations.

Cons

• Increase in General Fund expenditures.

Alternative 2: Approve funding to maintain only the existing level of service.

Pros

- Maintains existing resources.
- Limits General Fund commitments and maintains previous investments.
- Cal-CSIC will continue to provide its existing level of service.

Cons

- Severely limits Cal-CSIC's ability to respond to increasing demand for services.
- Increases the cyber risk profile for the state, private sector and critical infrastructure partners.
- Increasing risk that Cal-CSIC will not be able to meet multiple statutory requirements, and/or will have increasingly degraded ability to meet remaining requirements as threat landscape evolves.
- Cal-CSIC will not be able to expand into unserved/underserved populations without making difficult decisions of which critical state services to limit support to.
- Potential risk of perception among Cal-CSIC partners (especially non-state) that state does not take cybersecurity risk seriously enough to counter threat and keep California safe.

G. Implementation Plan

Cal OES and CDT will advertise and fill positions. CMD and CHP will advertise for assignment opportunities from within their organizations' existing military personnel and CHP officers, respectively. Upon hiring and assignment to the Cal-CSIC, Cal OES will begin in-processing personnel from each of the four agencies and mandatory personnel training, as appropriate. Onboarding training will be followed by specialized Cybersecurity and Incident Response training.

- Conduct training on standard procedures, automated tools, and cyber incident mobilization training.
- Implement processes to proactively analyze and assess risks based on evolving cyber threats.
- Provide outreach to state agencies to assist with implementing best practices to minimize the impact and severity of cyberattacks.
- Conduct analytics on malicious software to determine the full extent of actual or
 potential damage it could cause; share the indicators with other agencies to
 implement blocks and other mitigating steps as necessary to prevent spread of the
 attack through similar methods.
- Respond on-site with highly skilled, trained, and experienced cybersecurity analysts and law enforcement personnel necessary to stop an active attack, pull analytics and share with other agencies, and for law enforcement cyber personnel to conduct forensics necessary to prosecute cyber criminals.

H. Supplemental Information

No supplemental information.

I. Recommendation

Approve \$28.7 million General Fund ongoing and 17 positions to continue limited-term resources authorized in 2020-21 (including 23 of the 24 previously authorized positions) and enhance resources to support the responsibilities of the Cal-CSIC. These resources will allow the Cal-CSIC to lead state efforts to identify and mitigate current and ever-evolving cyber threats, including providing enhanced (1) threat detection, assessment, and research; (2) gap testing and remediation; and (3) incident analysis and response.

BCP Fiscal Detail Sheet

BCP Title: California Cybersecurity Integration Center

BR Name: 0690-019-BCP-2023-GB

Budget Request Summary

Personal Services

Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Salaries and Wages	0	1,398	1,398	1,398	1,398	1,398
Earnings - Permanent						
Salaries and Wages	0	91	91	91	91	91
Overtime/Other						
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$1,489	\$1,489	\$1,489	\$1,489	\$1,489
Total Staff Benefits	0	820	820	820	820	820
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$2,309	\$2,309	\$2,309	\$2,309	\$2,309

Operating Expenses and Equipment

Operating Expenses and Equipment	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5301 - General Expense	0	240	240	240	240	240
5302 - Printing	0	20	20	20	20	20
5304 - Communications	0	120	120	120	120	120
5306 - Postage	0	20	20	20	20	20
5320 - Travel: In-State	0	100	100	100	100	100
5322 - Training	0	40	40	40	40	40
5324 - Facilities Operation	0	260	260	260	260	260
5326 - Utilities	0	20	20	20	20	20
5340 - Consulting and Professional Services - External	0	5,600	5,600	5,600	5,600	5,600
5346 - Information Technology	0	4,943	4,896	4,896	4,896	4,896
539X - Other	0	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Total Operating Expenses and Equipment	\$0	\$13,273	\$13,226	\$13,226	\$13,226	\$13,226

Total Budget Request

Total Budget Request	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
Total Budget Request	\$0	\$15,582	\$15,535	\$15,535	\$15,535	\$15,535

Fund Summary

Fund Source

Fund Source	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
T dild Codico	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
State Operations - 0001 - General Fund	0	15,582	15,535	15,535	15,535	15,535
Total State Operations Expenditures	\$0	\$15,582	\$15,535	\$15,535	\$15,535	\$15,535
Total All Funds	\$0	\$15,582	\$15,535	\$15,535	\$15,535	\$15,535

Program Summary

Program Funding

Program Funding	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
0380 - Emergency Management Services	0	15,582	15,535	15,535	15,535	15,535
9900100 - Administration	0	672	672	672	672	672
9900200 - Administration - Distributed	0	-672	-672	-672	-672	-672
Total All Programs	\$0	\$15,582	\$15,535	\$15,535	\$15,535	\$15,535

Personal Services Details

Salaries and Wages

Salaries and Wages	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
VR00 - Various	0	1,489	1,489	1,489	1,489	1,489
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$1,489	\$1,489	\$1,489	\$1,489	\$1,489
Staff Benefits						
Staff Benefits	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5150350 - Health Insurance	0	182	182	182	182	182
5150450 - Medicare Taxation	0	22	22	22	22	22
5150500 - OASDI	0	92	92	92	92	92
5150630 - Retirement - Public Employees - Miscellaneous	0	401	401	401	401	401
5150900 - Staff Benefits - Other	0	123	123	123	123	123
Total Staff Benefits	\$0	\$820	\$820	\$820	\$820	\$820
Total Personal Services						
Total Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$2,309	\$2,309	\$2,309	\$2,309	\$2,309

BCP Fiscal Detail Sheet

BCP Title: California Cybersecurity Integration Center

BR Name: 0690-100-BCP-2023-GB

Budget Request Summary

Personal Services

Personal Services						
Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Positions - Permanent	0.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
Total Positions	0.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
Salaries and Wages	0	1,654	1,654	1,654	1,654	1,654
Earnings - Permanent						
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$1,654	\$1,654	\$1,654	\$1,654	\$1,654
Total Staff Benefits	0	906	906	906	906	906
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$2,560	\$2,560	\$2,560	\$2,560	\$2,560
Operating Expenses and Equipment						
Operating Expenses and Equipment	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				

Operating Expenses and Equipment	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5340 - Consulting and Professional Services - External	0	4,804	4,804	4,804	4,804	4,804
539X - Other	0	267	267	267	267	267
Total Operating Expenses and Equipment	\$0	\$5,071	\$5,071	\$5,071	\$5,071	\$5,071

Total Budget Request

Total Budget Request	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
Total Budget Request	\$0	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631

Fund Summary

Fund Source

Fund Source	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
State Operations - 0001 - General Fund	0	7,631	7,631	7,631	7,631	7,631

Fund Source	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
Total State Operations Expenditures	\$0	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631
Total All Funds	\$0	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631

Program Summary

Program Funding

Program Funding	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
0380 - Emergency Management Services	0	7,631	7,631	7,631	7,631	7,631
Total All Programs	\$0	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631	\$7,631

Personal Services Details

Positions

Positions	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
VR00 - Various	0.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
Total Positions	0.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
Salaries and Wages						
Salaries and Wages	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
VR00 - Various	0	1,654	1,654	1,654	1,654	1,654
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$1,654	\$1,654	\$1,654	\$1,654	\$1,654
Staff Benefits						
Staff Benefits	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5150450 - Medicare Taxation	0	24	24	24	24	24
5150500 - OASDI	0	103	103	103	103	103
5150630 - Retirement - Public Employees - Miscellaneous	0	529	529	529	529	529
5150900 - Staff Benefits - Other	0	250	250	250	250	250
Total Staff Benefits	\$0	\$906	\$906	\$906	\$906	\$906
Total Personal Services						
Total Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$2,560	\$2,560	\$2,560	\$2,560	\$2,560

BCP Fiscal Detail Sheet

BCP Title: California Cybersecurity Integration Center

BR Name: 2720-026-BCP-2023-GB

Budget Request Summary

Personal Services						
Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Positions - Permanent	0.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0
Total Positions	0.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0
Salaries and Wages	0	384	384	384	384	384
Earnings - Permanent						
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$384	\$384	\$384	\$384	\$384
Total Staff Benefits	0	363	363	363	363	363
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$747	\$747	\$747	\$747	\$747
Operating Expenses and Equipment						
Operating Expenses and Equipment	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5301 - General Expense	0	102	102	102	102	102
Total Operating Expenses and Equipment	\$0	\$102	\$102	\$102	\$102	\$102
Total Budget Request						
Total Budget Request	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
3 4	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Total Budget Request	\$0	\$849	\$849	\$849	\$849	\$849

Fund Summary

Fund Source

Fund Source	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
State Operations - 0001 - General Fund	0	849	849	849	849	849
Total State Operations Expenditures	\$0	\$849	\$849	\$849	\$849	\$849

Fund Source	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
Total All Funds	\$0	\$849	\$849	\$849	\$849	\$849

Program Summary

Program Funding

Program Funding	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
2050010 - Ground Operations	0	849	849	849	849	849
Total All Programs	\$0	\$849	\$849	\$849	\$849	\$849

Personal Services Details

Positions

Positions	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
VR00 - Various	0.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0
Total Positions	0.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0
Salaries and Wages						
Salaries and Wages	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
•	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
VR00 - Various	0	384	384	384	384	384
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$384	\$384	\$384	\$384	\$384
Staff Benefits						
Staff Benefits	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5150900 - Staff Benefits - Other	0	363	363	363	363	363
Total Staff Benefits	\$0	\$363	\$363	\$363	\$363	\$363
Total Personal Services						
Total Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$747	\$747	\$747	\$747	\$747

BCP Fiscal Detail Sheet

BCP Title: California Cybersecurity Integration Center

BR Name: 7502-005-BCP-2023-GB

Budget Request Summary

Personal Services

Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Salaries and Wages	0	821	821	821	821	821
Earnings - Permanent						
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$821	\$821	\$821	\$821	\$821
Total Staff Benefits	0	443	443	443	443	443
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$1,264	\$1,264	\$1,264	\$1,264	\$1,264

Operating Expenses and Equipment

Operating Expenses and Equipment	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5301 - General Expense	0	12	12	12	12	12
5302 - Printing	0	6	6	6	6	6
5304 - Communications	0	12	12	12	12	12
5320 - Travel: In-State	0	36	36	36	36	36
5322 - Training	0	60	60	60	60	60
5324 - Facilities Operation	0	78	78	78	78	78
5340 - Consulting and Professional Services - External	0	6	6	6	6	6
5342 - Departmental Services	0	224	224	224	224	224
5346 - Information Technology	0	18	18	18	18	18
Total Operating Expenses and Equipment	\$0	\$452	\$452	\$452	\$452	\$452

Total Budget Request

Total Budget Request	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
Total Budget Request	\$0	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716

Fund Summary

Fund Source

Fund Source	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
State Operations - 0001 - General Fund	0	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716
Total State Operations Expenditures	\$0	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716
Total All Funds	\$0	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716

Program Summary

Program Funding

Program Funding	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
6230 - Department of Technology	0	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716
Total All Programs	\$0	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716	\$1,716

Personal Services Details

Staff Benefits

Staff Benefits	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5150350 - Health Insurance	0	125	125	125	125	125
5150450 - Medicare Taxation	0	12	12	12	12	12
5150500 - OASDI	0	51	51	51	51	51
5150600 - Retirement - General	0	255	255	255	255	255
Total Staff Benefits	\$0	\$443	\$443	\$443	\$443	\$443
Total Personal Services						

Total Personal Services	FY23 Current	FY23 Budget	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
	Year	Year		5. 2	5.10	5.11
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$443	\$443	\$443	\$443	\$443

BCP Fiscal Detail Sheet

BCP Title: California Cybersecurity Integration Center

BR Name: 7502-039-BCP-2023-GB

Budget Request Summary

Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Positions - Permanent	0.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Total Positions	0.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Salaries and Wages	0	393	393	393	393	393
Earnings - Permanent						
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$393	\$393	\$393	\$393	\$393
Total Staff Benefits	0	221	221	221	221	221
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$614	\$614	\$614	\$614	\$614
Operating Expenses and Equipment						
Operating Expenses and Equipment	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
Operating Expenses and Equipment	FY23 Current	FY23 Budget	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
Operating Expenses and Equipment						
Operating Expenses and Equipment 5301 - General Expense	Current Year	Budget				
	Current Year	Budget Year	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
5301 - General Expense	Current Year	Budget Year 1,030	BY+1 1,030	BY+2 1,030	BY+3 1,030	BY+4 1,030
5301 - General Expense Total Operating Expenses and Equipment Total Budget Request	Current Year	Budget Year 1,030	BY+1 1,030	BY+2 1,030	BY+3 1,030	BY+4 1,030
5301 - General Expense Total Operating Expenses and Equipment	Current Year 0 \$0	Budget Year 1,030 \$1,030	1,030 \$1,030	1,030 \$1,030	1,030 \$1,030	1,030 \$1,030
5301 - General Expense Total Operating Expenses and Equipment Total Budget Request	Current Year 0 \$0	Budget Year 1,030 \$1,030	1,030 \$1,030 FY23	1,030 \$1,030 FY23	1,030 \$1,030 FY23	1,030 \$1,030 FY23

Fund Source

Fund Source	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
State Operations - 0001 - General Fund	0	1,644	1,644	1,644	1,644	1,644
Total State Operations Expenditures	\$0	\$1,644	\$1,644	\$1,644	\$1,644	\$1,644

Fund Source	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
Total All Funds	\$0	\$1,644	\$1,644	\$1,644	\$1,644	\$1,644

Program Summary

Program Funding

Program Funding	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
6230 - Department of Technology	0	1,644	1,644	1,644	1,644	1,644
Total All Programs	\$0	\$1,644	\$1,644	\$1,644	\$1,644	\$1,644

Personal Services Details

Positions

Positions	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
VR00 - Various	0.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Total Positions	0.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Salaries and Wages						
Salaries and Wages	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
ŭ	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
VR00 - Various	0	393	393	393	393	393
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$393	\$393	\$393	\$393	\$393
Staff Benefits						
Staff Benefits	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5150900 - Staff Benefits - Other	0	221	221	221	221	221
Total Staff Benefits	\$0	\$221	\$221	\$221	\$221	\$221
Total Personal Services						
Total Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$614	\$614	\$614	\$614	\$614

BCP Fiscal Detail Sheet

BCP Title: California Cybersecurity Integration Center

BR Name: 8940-024-BCP-2023-GB

Budget Request Summary

Personal Services

Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Salaries and Wages	0	685	685	685	685	685
Earnings - Permanent						
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$685	\$685	\$685	\$685	\$685
Total Staff Benefits	0	546	546	546	546	546
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$1,231	\$1,231	\$1,231	\$1,231	\$1,231

Operating Expenses and Equipment

Operating Expenses and Equipment	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5301 - General Expense	0	8	8	8	8	8
5304 - Communications	0	8	8	8	8	8
5320 - Travel: In-State	0	16	16	16	16	16
5322 - Training	0	8	8	8	8	8
5326 - Utilities	0	16	16	16	16	16
5368 - Non-Capital Asset Purchases - Equipment	0	23	6	6	6	6
539X - Other	0	8	8	8	8	8
Total Operating Expenses and Equipment	\$0	\$87	\$70	\$70	\$70	\$70

Total Budget Request

Total Budget Request	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
Total Budget Request	\$0	\$1,318	\$1,301	\$1,301	\$1,301	\$1,301

Fund Summary

Fund Source

Fund Source	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
l dila deales	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
State Operations - 0001 - General Fund	0	1,318	1,301	1,301	1,301	1,301
Total State Operations Expenditures	\$0	\$1,318	\$1,301	\$1,301	\$1,301	\$1,301
Total All Funds	\$0	\$1,318	\$1,301	\$1,301	\$1,301	\$1,301

Program Summary

Program Funding

Program Funding	FY23 Current Year	FY23 Budget Year	FY23 BY+1	FY23 BY+2	FY23 BY+3	FY23 BY+4
6911035 - Military Civil Support	0	1,318	1,301	1,301	1,301	1,301
Total All Programs	\$0	\$1,318	\$1,301	\$1,301	\$1,301	\$1,301

Personal Services Details

Salaries and Wages

Salaries and Wages	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
7748 - E7 (Eff. 07-01-2023)	0	87	87	87	87	87
7749 - E6 (Eff. 07-01-2023)	0	230	230	230	230	230
8368 - W2 (Eff. 07-01-2023)	0	183	183	183	183	183
9167 - O2 (Eff. 07-01-2023)	0	185	185	185	185	185
Total Salaries and Wages	\$0	\$685	\$685	\$685	\$685	\$685

Staff Benefits

Staff Benefits	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
5150150 - Dental Insurance	0	1	1	1	1	1
5150210 - Disability Leave - Nonindustrial	0	39	39	39	39	39
5150350 - Health Insurance	0	205	205	205	205	205
5150450 - Medicare Taxation	0	10	10	10	10	10
5150500 - OASDI	0	45	45	45	45	45
5150600 - Retirement - General	0	213	213	213	213	213
5150800 - Workers' Compensation	0	33	33	33	33	33
Total Staff Benefits	\$0	\$546	\$546	\$546	\$546	\$546

Total Personal Services

Total Personal Services	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23	FY23
	Current	Budget	BY+1	BY+2	BY+3	BY+4
	Year	Year				
Total Personal Services	\$0	\$1,231	\$1,231	\$1,231	\$1,231	\$1,231